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Iraq and French multi-polarity
JANUARY 2004 | Opinion archive
President Chirac makes good sense on maintaining a global network of broadly equal powers, or multi-polarity. But the essence of multi-polarity is horse trading around shared values. Given the French view of the world is strikingly similar to American view, they both want more democracy and more cooperation, it is odd that France is not cooperating over Iraq  

The spirit of Agincourt livesPresident Chirac has just been interviewed by the BBC. France and Britain might be celebrating a century of Entente Cordiale but Mr Chirac holds few punches when making one point vitally clear: no support for Les Anglos over Iraq.

It is hard to consider his tone as anything other than uncompromising: "The American president says he will not change his position, which I can understand perfectly. France has hers, and she won't change either."

French leaders do speak like this from time-to-time and so do British leaders even if the entente seems able to often rise above the fray. The alliance between the tow Euroean powers may have been forged in a massively different world. At its inception, in 1904, the memory of Queen Victoria was an indisputable force (although she died in 1902 two years before it was signed). Britain stood ascendant over a quarter of the world and France also controlled many lands in Africa and Asia so there was a genuine sense of shared interests. These seemed to surpass occasionally barbed comments.    

In the century following 1904 Anglo-French interests aligned at critical moments. Britain aided France in not one but two wars. First a Prussian militarist was defeated and then a Bohemian corporal. And later there was the small matter of defeating a Russian bear. Throughout both countries restrained from blatant trade protectionism against the other. Each acquiesced to some degree in the others retention of economic pre-eminence whilst they disconnected themselves from worthless colonies. To crown a mostly functioning relationship France and Britain physically connected themselves with a tunnel in the 1980s. 

France's logic on multi-polarity in the 2000s
In the early 21st century France has gravitated much more than Britian towards the idea of multi-polarity. This is the idea that the world is best served by multiple centres of power rather than just one (by which they mean America) or maybe two (by which they mean China and America). Already within a handful of years of the end of Cold War multi-polarity defines France’s view of the new world and their place within that world; it is a big part of their grande image

Mr Chirac: "We are heading, inevitably, I have said it before, for a multi-polar world, in which there will be an American pole, a Chinese pole, a South American pole, an African pole, I hope, and a European pole."

Britain may be less convinced and it is not difficult to imagine the distaste in Downing Street as the Elysee portrays herself as a foil to America and a beacon for the up-and-coming states of the world. France, unlike Britain and America, will befriend le petit homme, the little man. And Mr Chirac is not shy to reveal whom he has in mind: Chinese, Latin Americans, Africans, Europeans. Actually he missed one: Indians. This will be world’s most populous country in a few decades. Its exports to China are already exceeding China's exports to India. It is the world’s largest democracy and it is a nuclear power. 

Apart from missing India this view has many merits. In fact its almost a banker that in a few decades America will also be favourable to a multi-polar world. More than that Washington will love multi-polarity. 

Soon China and India will once again be ascendant first-class world powers. They will naturally dominate a world where most peoples have broadly equal incomes. And therefore the largest economies will tend to be those with the largest population. Today’s asymmetric economic landscape will be only a memory and a curiosity. America, with fewer than 5% of the world's population, will possess a fraction of today’s dominance. Britain, with a mere 60 millions or under 1% of the world's people will be nowhere near the world’s fourth largest economy. France, with an identical population to Britain will experience a similar slide. All will end up with a slice of the pie roughly equal to their proportion of the world's peoples.  

Played out over time children alive today will experience something scarcely fathomable to their parents. Even if – even if – a united Europe and a United States, each with well over 300 millions, form unshakeable union they will still be dwarfed economically and politically by China or India of over a billion people each.

In that world, barely a few decades away, America will support multi-polarity at the drop of a hat. So will Britain. In fact, so will everybody except perhaps China and India who may end up as the losers more times than they would like. So, well said Mr Chirac. A multi-polar world is where we will all reside soon enough.  

France's logic on Iraq
Although the French call on multi-polarity holds many sensible thoughts, France's current hesitancy to support America on Iraq exposes a ticklish irony. Look carefully and there is an obvious feature to multi-polarity which is worth re-stating as Mr Chirac seems to sidestep it often. Multiple centres of power does not mean multiple views. In fact quite the contrary: in a multi-polar world like-minded alliances are vital. 

The China and India of the future, in simple terms, will tussle over something approaching half of the world’s power. If they are in union there is little or nothing the rest of the world can do. When they are not in union, however, the balance of power will fall to smaller players. Five such junior partners will probably tussle out this quest for power: the old powers of America and Europe and the new authorities of Africa, Latin America and non-Chinese Asia 

These smaller players will have two essential choices. First, ally with China or India, or perhaps both. Second, ally with each other and be treated as near equals, perhaps, or certainly as important power brokers. Hence there will be an increased need amongst the minor powers (like France and to some extent America) for comparable views and co-operation at important moments. France acting through Europe will therefore find themselves mutually interested to co-operate with America in a multi-polar world.

Which is why the French position on Iraq becomes curious. Why stand so firm against a future partner in a multi-polar world? Why forgo a role in what should be a natural complement to a world made in France's image: democracy, liberalization, secularism. All these America is seeking – or says she is seeking – in Iraq. And all these America sought and built in post-war France. 

President Chirac also noted in his interview with the BBC that "History will no doubt reveal who was wrong and who was right." True. But he should be careful. Should a democratic, somewhat liberal, secular and intact Iraq emerge from American administration and from this a sea change in the Middle East, history will note France erred in excluding themselves from that accomplishment. This will need the Sunni and Shiite side of Iraq to forgo their differences which at the moment is not clear. But Iraqi and Arabian democratisation will be seen as something that happened despite France. And in a multi-polar world that would be the last kind of baggage France needs. 


 
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